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Coexistence of plants depends on their competition for common resources and indirect in-
teractions mediated by shared exploiters or mutualists. These interactions are driven either by
changes in animal abundance (density-mediated interactions, e.g., apparent competition), or
by changes in animal preferences for plants (behaviorally-mediated interactions). This article
studies effects of behaviorally-mediated interactions on two plant population dynamics and
animal preference dynamics when animal densities are fixed. Animals can be either adaptive
exploiters or adaptive mutualists (e.g., herbivores or pollinators) that maximize their fitness.
Analysis of the model shows that adaptive animal preferences for plants can lead to multiple
outcomes of plant coexistence with different levels of specialization or generalism for the medi-
ator animal species. In particular, exploiter generalism promotes plant coexistence even when
inter-specific competition is too strong to make plant coexistence possible without exploiters,
and mutualist specialization promotes plant coexistence at alternative stable states when plant
inter-specific competition is weak. Introducing a new concept of generalized isoclines allows
us to fully analyze the model with respect to the strength of competitive interactions between
plants (weak or strong), and the type of interaction between plants and animals (exploitation
or mutualism).
Keywords: behaviorally-mediated interactions, competition for preference, differential inclu-
sion, generalized isocline, switching, sliding and repelling regimes.
Highlights:
• Adaptive exploiters make coexistence of two strongly competing plant species possible.
• Adaptive mutualists promote alternative plant coexistence states under weak competition.
• Adaptive mutualists always specialize on a single plant.
• The theory extends the isocline concept for ecological models with adaptive traits.
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1. Introduction
How do competing species coexist has been a puzzling question for ecologists. The competitive exclusion
principle states that two species competing for the same resource cannot coexist at an equilibrium (Gause,
1934; Hardin, 1960). This view is supported by the Lotka–Volterra competition model which predicts that
coexistence requires inter-specific competition to be weaker than intra-specific competition. The ecological
interpretation is that niche overlap for competing species cannot be too large for species coexistence at
an equilibrium (MacArthur and Levins, 1967). These early models of competition focused on two species
competing either directly, or indirectly (i.e., interference vs. exploitative competition). Exploitative
competition is an example of indirect interaction between two populations mediated by common resources
(Grover, 1997). Another indirect interaction is apparent competition (Holt, 1977) that is mediated by
shared consumers. In these competitive scenarios coexistence requires that species are limited by different
factors. Thus, two exponentially growing plants will not coexist if they are limited by the same resource
(“R∗” rule, Tilman 1982) or by the same single predator (“P ∗” rule, Holt et al. 1994). Plant–animal
mutualisms, on the other hand, can lead to apparent facilitation as in the case of pollination (Feinsinger,
1987; Ghazoul, 2006) where two plants flowering in different times can sustain large pollinator populations
(Waser and Real, 1979).
Indirect interactions can be either density- or behaviorally-mediated. In density-mediated indirect inter-
actions the mediator species density changes. E.g., in apparent competition an increase in one plant density
increases herbivore density which, in turn, decreases density of the other plant species. In behaviorally-
mediated indirect interactions changes in one plant population density are transmitted through changes
in animal behavior when animal population density is fixed. In reality, both density- and trait-mediated
indirect interactions operate concurrently (Bolker et al., 2003; Křivan and Schmitz, 2004). Analysis of
the apparent competition food web module with two plants and their common consumers who undergo
population dynamics and adaptively change their foraging preferences showed that combination of density-
and behaviorally-mediated interactions promotes plant coexistence that would not be possible if consumer
preferences were fixed (Křivan, 1997). Even when consumers were kept at fixed densities but they adap-
tively changed their preferences for plants, plant coexistence was still promoted by behaviorally-mediated
interactions only (Křivan, 2003b). This suggests that in antagonistic networks adaptive foraging promotes
species coexistence by reducing apparent competition. This was verified in more complex antagonistic di-
and tri- trophic food web modules with many species (Křivan, 2010). In simulated complex antagonistic
food-webs adaptive prey switching also led to increased species persistence (Kondoh, 2003; Berec et al.,
2010).
Antagonistic interactions such as competition, predation and parasitism are cornerstones of the niche
centric view of community structure (e.g., food webs, guilds), and theories of ecological dynamics and
biodiversity (e.g., stability–complexity debate). Currently, there is a great interest about the role of
mutualisms as factors shaping communities (Bastolla et al., 2009; Bronstein, 2015). As it turns out,
many mutualisms are mediated by consumer–resource mechanisms, and several of them evolved from
exploitative relationships such as parasitisms (Bronstein, 2015). Thus, we may be able to understand
consequences of both mutualisms and antagonisms using common methodologies (Holland and DeAngelis,
2010). Several models considered apparent competition or apparent facilitation separately, and more
recently, also together in the context of mixed mutualistic–antagonistic communities (Mougi and Kondoh,
2014; Sauve et al., 2016). A limited number of models consider density- and behaviorally-mediated effects
transmitted by mutualisms. Some predict that adaptive mutualism promotes coexistence in the case of
large communities (Valdovinos et al., 2013; Mougi and Kondoh, 2014), while others predict that adaptation
constrain coexistence by favoring profitable partner species in detriment to rare ones (Revilla and Křivan,
2016). Thus, more research is required to evaluate the importance of adaptation and plasticity as drivers
of population dynamics and community structure in interaction networks that combine both mutualistic
and antagonistic interactions. And this motivates us to explore how adaptive behavior of exploiters or
mutualists changes the outcomes of competition between the plants with which they interact.
2
In this article we analyze how behaviorally-mediated interactions transmitted by shared animals influ-
ence plant competition. We demonstrate that foraging behavior of animal exploiters (e.g., herbivores) or
mutualists (e.g., pollinators) can have important and predictable consequences for plant competitive co-
existence. By assuming that animal population densities are fixed, we eliminate density-mediated effects,
e.g., apparent competition or apparent facilitation. In this way, we can focus entirely on indirect effects
that are mediated only by changes in animal preferences (i.e., they are trait-mediated) for plants. We give
conditions for plant coexistence at an equilibrium under exploitation or mutualism either when interaction
strength is fixed, or when it is adaptive and maximizes animal fitness.
A plant competition model with adaptive preferences of one animal species for two plants is presented
in Section 2. Because optimal animal strategy is not uniquely defined when both plants provide the same
payoffs to animals, plant population dynamics are described by a differential inclusion (Aubin and Cellina,
1984; Colombo and Křivan, 1993). For such models we introduce generalized isoclines that allow us to fully
analyze the model. Section 3 provides a complete classification of plant equilibria and corresponding animal
preferences when animals are either exploiters or mutualists and when inter-specific plant competition is
either weak or strong. We conclude that adaptive exploitation permits global stable coexistence when
competition between plants is weak, and global or local stable coexistence when competition is strong. In
the case of adaptive mutualism only weakly competing plants can coexist at a single equilibrium or at one
of two alternative stable states.
2. Model
We consider an interaction module consisting of two competing plant species with population densities
P1 and P2 and one animal species with population density A. The important feature of this interaction
module is that plant–animal interactions can be either exploitative (e.g., folivory, granivory, modeled by
parameter s = −1) or mutualistic (e.g., pollination, seed dispersal, s = 1). We assume that animal
population density A is fixed, and we are interested in plant population dynamics that are described by a
Lotka–Volterra (LV) model
dP1
dt
= r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
)
P1 + su1P1A
dP2
dt
= r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
)
P2 + su2P2A
(1)
where ri > 0 and Ki > 0 are plant intrinsic growth rates and environmental carrying capacities in absence
of inter-specific interactions, and ci ≥ 0 is the competition coefficient that measures competitive effects of
plant i on the other plant. The strength of plant–animal interactions depends on animal density (A) as
well as on animal preferences u1 and u2 for plant 1 and 2, respectively (ui ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 and u1+u2 = 1).
Preference for plant i can be interpreted as the proportion of time that an animal spends interacting with
that plant, or, alternatively, as the fraction of the animal population (uiA) interacting with that plant.
When animals are mutualists (s = 1), model (1) assumes facultative mutualism for plants, i.e., plant
populations can grow even without animals. This is a reasonable assumption because the great majority
of plants do not rely on a single mutualist species. E.g., when the mutualist is a pollinator, plants can
be pollinated by other means (e.g., by wind, or another pollinator species that is not being explicitly
considered). Another feature of model (1) is that it assumes constant animal density. This can be a
reasonable assumption if plant population dynamics are faster than animal population dynamics or model
(1) describes plant dynamics in a small locality, saturated at level A by a large regional population of
highly mobile animals (Melián et al., 2009). In these scenarios effects of plants on animal population
density (i.e., the numeric response) can be ignored. However, feedbacks between plant density and animal
foraging behavior can remain important. Animal adaptation in response to changes in plant community
composition affects animal fitness even when the numerical response is not considered. In turn, changes
in animal preference influence population density of plants and alter plant community composition. The
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constant animal density assumption allows us to focus on behavior-mediated effects arising from adaptive
animal preferences for plants.
For fixed animal preferences ui (i = 1, 2) model (1) is the classical Lotka–Volterra competitive system
with well known dynamics (e.g., Case, 2000; Rohr et al., 2014). In particular, both plants coexist at a
globally stable equilibrium
(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) =
(
K1r2(r1 + sAu1)− c2K2r1(r2 + sAu2)
r1r2(1− c1c2)
,
K2r1(r2 + sAu2)− c1K1r2(r1 + sAu1)
r1r2(1− c1c2)
)
(2)
if and only if the ratio of carrying capacities satisfies1
c2(1 + su2A/r2)
1 + su1A/r1
<
K1
K2
<
1 + su2A/r2
c1(1 + su1A/r1)
. (3)
Thus, stable plant coexistence requires that
c1c2 < 1. (4)
When inequalities in (3) are reversed, equilibrium (2) is still feasible for intermediate K1/K2 ratios, but
it is unstable, i.e., either plant 1 or 2 wins depending on initial conditions. This is the bi-stable outcome for
the LV model when inter-specific competition is stronger relative to intra-specific competition (c1c2 > 1).
If under exploitation uiA > ri, plant i is not viable and no interior equilibrium exists.
In the next sections we show that these predictions change when animals behave adaptively and they
maximize their fitness.
2.1. Adaptive animal preferences
Here we assume that animal preferences change in the direction that maximizes animal fitness. The payoff
to an animal when feeding on plant i(= 1, 2) is measured, e.g., as the amount of energy obtained per unit of
time, i.e., eiPi where ei denotes the amount of energy obtained from a single plant per unit of time. Animal
fitness is then defined as the average payoff, i.e., WA = e1u1P1 + e2u2P2 where u1 + u2 = 1 and ui ≥ 0.
Under the ideal circumstances where individuals have a perfect knowledge about plant profitabilities and
abundances, maximization of this fitness leads to the following optimal foraging strategy (Křivan, 2003b;
Křivan and Vrkoč, 2007):
u1 ∈ U1(P1, P2) =


{0} when e1P1 < e2P2
[0, 1] when e1P1 = e2P2
{1} when e1P1 > e2P2.
(5)
When plant densities are such that
e1P1 = e2P2, (6)
animal preference for plant 1 (u1) is not uniquely defined and can take any value between 0 and 1. This
is because either of the two plants provides the same payoff for animals.
The switching line (6) splits the positive quadrant of plant density phase space in two sectors, as shown
in Figure 1. In both of these sectors, animals behave as specialists. In sector I (sector II), which is below
(above) the switching line, animals specialize on plant 1 (plant 2) only because this maximizes their fitness.
For plant densities along the switching line, animals have intermediate preferences (0 < u1 < 1), i.e., they
are generalists that interact with both plants.
We observe that when u1 is defined by (5), model (1) becomes a differential inclusion, or, equivalently, a
Filippov (1988) regularization of a differential equation with a discontinuous right hand side (see Appendix
A.1; Colombo and Křivan, 1993). To analyze such models we introduce in the next section generalized
isoclines.
1When A = 0 inequalities (3) reduce to c2 <
K1
K2
< 1
c1
which are the classic conditions for stable coexistence in the
Lotka–Volterra competition model.
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Figure 1. Interactions as a function of plant densities (axes) when animal preference changes according to the step-like
rule (5). Below the switching line (6) animals specialize on plant 1, and above they specialize on plant 2. Generalism occurs
along the switching line where animals display intermediate preferences for plants.
2.2. Interaction dynamics
Generalized isoclines
The effect of adaptive animals on plant coexistence can be predicted by isocline analysis in the plant
1–plant 2 phase plane. However, because population dynamics (1) together with animal preferences (5)
are described by a differential inclusion, we need to define generalized plant isoclines for this model.
Isoclines need to be defined in both sectors I and II, as well as in the switching line (6).
Within sectors I or II plant 1 and 2 isoclines are
P1 + c2P2 = H1
P2 + c1P1 = H2,
(7)
respectively. Here
(H1 , H2) =


(
K1(1 +
sA
r1
), K2
)
in sector I(
K1, K2(1 +
sA
r2
)
)
in sector II
(8)
are sector-dependent adjusted carrying capacities that depend on exploitative (s = −1) or mutualistic
animal effects (s = 1). For isoclines to exist in both sectors, H1 and H2 in (8) must be positive, i.e.,
ri + sA > 0, i = 1, 2. Plant i monoculture is viable under exploitation if A < ri, i.e., plant i has limited
tolerance for exploitation. If A > r1 (A > r2), isocline for plant 1 (plant 2) does not exist in sector I (sector
II) under exploitation. On the other hand, monocultures are always viable under facultative mutualism
(ri +A > 0).
As a result, isoclines in sectors I and II are piece-wise linear as illustrated in Figure 2. Plant 1 isocline
in sector I is the line segment connecting points b and E1, and in sector II is the line segment connecting
points k1 and a. Point
E1 = (P
∗
1 , 0) =
(
K1
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
, 0
)
(9)
is plant 1 monoculture equilibrium of model (1), and formulas for intersection points a, b (with switching
line) and k1 (with P2 axis) are given in Appendix A.1. Similarly, plant 2 isocline consists of line segments
connecting points E2 and p in sector II, and q and k2 in sector I. Point
E2 = (0, P
∗
2 ) =
(
0 , K2
(
1 +
sA
r2
))
(10)
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Figure 2. Generalized isoclines (plant 1: black, plant 2: gray) and plant dynamics under weak competition (c1c2 < 1).
The (dashed) switching line (6) splits the phase plane in sectors I and II. Stable equilibria are shown as dots, and unstable
equilibria as circles. Panel a assumes low population of exploiters and isoclines intersect at a stable equilibrium in sector I. As
the number of exploiters increases (panel b), plants coexist at stable equilibrium ES at the switching line where animals are
generalists. In panel c animals are mutualists and isoclines intersect at two stable equilibria, one in each sector. Equilibrium
ES is unstable. Parameter values: ri = 0.1, ci = 0.6, e1 = 1.5, e2 = 1, A = 0.04, K1 = 22; K2 = 12 in (a) and K2 = 20 in
(b,c); s = −1 in panels a,b, and s = 1 in panel c.
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is plant 2 monoculture equilibrium of model (1), and intersection points p, q (with switching line) and k2
(with P1 axis) are given in Appendix A.1. We remark that both monoculture equilibria exist for mutualists
while for exploiters, plant i monoculture equilibrium exists if A < ri.
We define generalized isoclines by adding the segment a—b to plant 1 isocline, and segment p—q to
plant 2 isocline. Thus, both plant isoclines are continuous, piece-wise linear curves in plant phase space.
Plant 1 (plant 2) isocline is shown as the black (gray) line in Figure 2. We stress here, that along their
central segments (a—b for plant 1 isocline, and p—q for plant 2 isocline) the usual definition of isoclines
as points of zero growth for particular plant species does not hold for generalized isoclines. In particular,
we show in the next section that when the two segments partially overlap along the switching line as in
Figure 2b, c, the overlap segment (b—q in panel b and a—p in panel c) does not consist of equilibria
only, as we explain in the next section.
We remark that under exploitation (s = −1) plant 1 (plant 2) generalized isocline consists of three
segments if r1 > A (r2 > A). Otherwise, the isocline has only two segments because E1 and b (E2 and
p) are not in the first quadrant. In case of mutualism (s = 1) generalized isoclines always consist of three
segments because monocultures are viable since we assume that mutualism is facultative.
Appendix D shows that generalized isoclines obtained for step-like preferences given in (5) are well
approximated by smooth (usual) isoclines when preferences are more gradual. However, the generalized
isoclines allow us to fully analyze the model.
Model equilibria
In the classic Lotka–Volterra (LV) model (1) stable plant coexistence requires that the missing species can
invade when the other plant is at its population equilibrium. This is a consequence of linear isoclines that
generically intersect at most once. The case where animals behave adaptively is more complex, because
generalized isoclines are piece-wise linear and there can be interior equilibria in both sectors (e.g., Figure
2c). In addition, we show in this section that there is one equilibrium at the segment of the switching line
where the two isoclines coincide (e.g., Figure 2b, c).
We start by analyzing position of isoclines in sectors I and II. Since isoclines are linear there they can
intersect in either sector at most once. If they intersect, the corresponding equilibrium is locally stable2
when c1c2 < 1 and unstable when c1c2 > 1. This follows from analysis of the classic LV competition
model. We also observe that at these equilibria animals behave as specialists as they interact with a single
plant only. To determine if isoclines intersect within a sector, we compare their intersections with the
corresponding sector’s axis and with the switching line (6). In sector I we compare position of equilibrium
E1 with respect to point k2 on P1 axis, and position of point b with respect to point q on the switching
line. If E1 exists and
E1 < k2 and q < b (11)
by which we mean that point E1 is to the left of point k2 on P1 axes and point q is to the left and down
from point b along the line e1P1 = e2P2, or
E1 > k2 and q > b, (12)
Appendix A.1 shows that there is one coexistence equilibrium
EI =
(
Pˆ1, Pˆ2
)
=
(
K1r2(r1 + sA)− c2K2r1r2
r1r2(1− c1c2)
,
K2r1r2 − c1K1r2(r1 + sA)
r1r2(1− c1c2)
)
(13)
in sector I and this equilibrium is locally stable when (11) holds because in this case c1c2 < 1 (Figure 2a,
c). If conditions in (12) hold, the equilibrium is unstable. Appendix A.1 shows that (11) is equivalent
with
γ2 ≡ c1
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
<
K2
K1
<
(
e1 + c1e2
e2 + c2e1
)(
1 +
sA
r1
)
≡ τ2. (14)
2By local stability we mean local asymptotic stability throughout this article.
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If both inequalities in (14) are reversed, EI still exists because isoclines intersect in sector I but the
equilibrium is unstable. If K2/K1 is larger or smaller than both γ2 and τ2, there is no equilibrium in
sector I because the two isoclines do not intersect there (e.g., Figure 2b where E1 < k2 but b < q).
Similarly, in sector II we compare position of k1 with respect to equilibrium E2 on the P2 axis, and
position of a with respect to p along the switching line. If equilibrium E2 exists and
E2 < k1 and a < p (15)
or
E2 > k1 and a > p, (16)
Appendix A.1 shows that there is one equilibrium in sector II
EII =
(
Pˆ1, Pˆ2
)
=
(
K1r1r2 − c2K2r1(r2 + sA)
r1r2(1− c1c2)
,
K2r1(r2 + sA)− c1K1r1r2
r1r2(1 − c1c2)
)
. (17)
This equilibrium is locally stable if and only if
γ1 ≡ c2
(
1 +
sA
r2
)
<
K1
K2
<
(
e2 + c2e1
e1 + c1e2
)(
1 +
sA
r2
)
≡ τ1. (18)
As in sector I, instability of EII follows from inequality reversal in (18). When K1/K2 is larger or smaller
than both γ1 and τ1, no equilibrium exists in sector II.
We note that γ1 and γ2 are invasion thresholds that must be met by K1/K2 and K2/K1, respectively,
for plant 1 to invade at equilibrium E2 and for plant 2 to invade at equilibrium E1, respectively. Invasion
thresholds depend on resident plant parameters, plant–animal interaction type, and animal density. For
example, γ1 is directly proportional to the competitive effect of plant 2 on plant 1 (c2) exactly as in
standard LV models. This means that increasing inter-specific competition makes plant 1 less likely
to invade resident population consisting of plant 2 only. Under exploitation, increasing animal density
decreases the threshold allowing plant 1 to invade, while increasing plant 2 intrinsic growth rate (r2)
makes this plant more difficult to invade. These predictions change under mutualism because the invasion
threshold for plant 1 increases with increasing density of mutualists and decreases with plant 2 intrinsic
growth rate.
Now we look for plant equilibria in the segment of the switching line where the two generalized isoclines
overlap. To answer this question we have to analyze plant dynamics (1) with optimal animal behavior
(5) on the switching line where animal preference for either plant is not uniquely defined. Analysis in
Appendix A.2 shows that when the two generalized isoclines partially overlap along the switching line,
there exists a single equilibrium in the overlap segment
ES = (P¯1, P¯2) =
(
e2K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
,
e1K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
)
, (19)
see Figure 2b, c. This equilibrium is locally stable under exploitation (Figure 2b) and unstable under
mutualism (Figure 2c). Appendix A.2 also shows that animal preference for plant 1 at this equilibrium is
u¯1 =
K2r1(r2 + sA)(e2 + c2e1)−K1r1r2(e1 + c1e2)
sA [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
, (20)
i.e., animals behave as generalists at this equilibrium.
This analysis allows us to give meaning to attraction thresholds τi defined in (14) and (18). For equilib-
rium ES to exist, u¯1 must be between 0 and 1. Under exploitation (s = −1) this happens when
K1
K2
> τ1 and
K2
K1
> τ2 (21)
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Figure 3. Plant coexistence under weak competition (c1c2 < 1) and adaptive exploitation (s = −1), for high (left column)
or low (right column) K1/K2 ratios. Top panels show stable plant coexistence (thick lines) and monoculture (E1 and E2,
thin lines) equilibria as a function of exploiter density. Bottom panels show corresponding exploiter preference for plant 1
(u1). It is interesting to observe that plant i(= 1, 2) monoculture is viable only when A ≤ ri while when together, both
plants form viable community for higher animal densities satisfying A ≤ r1 + r2. Parameter values: r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.08, ci =
0.6, e1 = 1.5, e2 = 1, K1 = 20.
while under mutualism (s = 1) the conditions are
K1
K2
< τ1 and
K2
K1
< τ2. (22)
Equilibrium ES exists when r1+r2+sA > 0 and it is always locally stable for exploitation (i.e., (21) holds
and “ES attracts” locally trajectories from both sectors) and unstable for mutualism (i.e., (22) holds and
“ES repels” trajectories away; see Appendix A.2). If only one attraction threshold is passed, equilibrium
ES does not exist and there is no plant population equilibrium at which animals behave as generalists.
Here the important observation is that existence and stability of equilibrium ES does not depend whether
single plant monocultures are viable or not. In fact, even if neither of the two plants is viable (i.e., A > ri,
i = 1, 2), equilibrium ES still exists provided A < r1+ r2 (Figure 3). We show next how plant coexistence
and animal preferences depend on animal abundance and model parameters.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of adaptive exploiters on plant equilibria and exploiter preferences for
plants. Let us consider the situation where
K1
K2
>
e2 + c2e1
e1 + c1e2
(23)
(left column of Figure 3). Without exploiters (A = 0), plant 1 wins competition over plant 2. As the
number of exploiters increases, exploiters are plant 1 specialists (u1 = 1, bottom-left panel) and plant
1 equilibrium density decreases until A ≈ 0.017. For higher exploiter density (approx. 0.017 < A <
0.055) plant 2 invades plant 1 monoculture and both plants coexist at equilibrium EI given in (13).
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Figure 4. Plant coexistence under weak competition (c1c2 < 1) and adaptive mutualism (s = 1), for high (left column) or
low (right column) K1/K2 ratios. Top panels show stable coexistence (EI and EII, thick lines) and monoculture (E1 and E2,
thin lines) equilibria as a function of exploiter density. Bottom panels show corresponding mutualist preference for plant 1
(u1). An alternative stable state (thick gray lines) emerges when u1 changes from 1 or 0 into 0 < u1 < 1. Parameter values:
ri = 0.1, ci = 0.6, e1 = 1.5, e2 = 1,K1 = 22.
Plant 1 population density keeps decreasing with increasing A while plant 2 population density increases.
Exploiters still behave as specialists on plant 1 till their population reaches another critical threshold
A ≈ 0.055. For yet higher exploiter density, animals behave as generalists feeding on both plants with
decreasing preference for plant 1 given in (20) and plants coexist at equilibrium ES given in (19). Thus,
both plant population densities now decrease with increasing animal abundance. The case where opposite
inequality in (23) holds is shown in the right panels of Figure 3. In this case, exploiters start as plant 2
specialists (u1 = 0, bottom-right panel) at plant equilibrium EII given in (17). Thus, plant 2 decreases
monotonically while plant 1 increases for 0 ≤ A < 0.021. Once both plants are equally profitable for
animals, animals become generalists and both plants start to decrease together as preference for plant 1
keeps increasing.
Figure 3 also shows that adaptive exploitation leads to indirect positive effects between plants. First,
when animals are adaptive exploiters, plant equilibrium densities are positive for animal densities at which
plant monocultures are not viable. E.g., plant 1 (plant 2) monoculture cannot exist for A > 0.1 (A > 0.08)
in Figure 3 but both plants do coexist at ES as long as A ≤ r1 + r2 = 0.18. Thus, for large exploiter
densities viability of plant 1 relies on co-occurrence with plant 2 and vice-versa. Second, from (19) it
follows that under generalism increasing K1 or K2 raises both plant equilibrium densities (cf. right vs. left
top panels in Figure 3 for A > 0.05). This is unlike standard LV models where increasing K2 causes
increase of plant 2 equilibrium density and decrease of plant 1. The effect of other parameters on plant
equilibria (EI,EII,ES) is given in Appendix B.
Effects of changes in parameters on plant equilibria in the case of mutualism are often in opposite
directions as compared to exploiters (see Appendix B). Because we assume that mutualism is facultative,
plant monocultures (E1 and E2) are always viable and they increase with A. Provided both plants coexist,
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plant 1 increases and plant 2 decreases with A at equilibrium EI, and the opposite happens at equilibrium
EII. Equilibrium ES, if it exists, is always unstable. Figure 4 serves as a good illustration. The left
column displays plant coexistence at equilibrium EI when A < 0.022 and animals specialize on plant 1
(u1 = 1). For higher animal densities there are two stable equilibria EI and EII and unstable interior
equilibrium ES at which animals are generalists. The right column shows situation where K1/K2 is lower
and plants coexists at equilibrium EII when A < 0.0115 and animals specialize on plant 2. For higher
animal densities there are two coexisting stable plant equilibria EI and EII and the unstable equilibrium
ES.
3. Plant coexistence under exploitation or mutualism
By comparing K1/K2 with γ1 and τ1 thresholds in (18), and K2/K1 with γ2 and τ2 thresholds in (14),
we provide a complete classification of model outcomes for all generic parameter combinations, see Ap-
pendix C. In the following sections we discuss all possible global dynamics when animals are exploiters or
mutualists, and plant inter-specific competition is weak or strong. In the particular case of exploitation,
we only display scenarios where A < r1 and A < r2, i.e., plant monocultures are viable and generalized
isoclines display three segments. Scenarios where monocultures are not viable, i.e., A > ri, lead to similar
global dynamics as long as r1 + r2 > A (i.e., if A > r1 + r2 both plants go extinct like in Figure 3).
3.1. Exploitation (s = −1) and weak inter-specific plant competition (c1c2 < 1)
All qualitatively different patterns of isoclines intersections when inter-specific competition is weak and
A < ri are shown in Figure 5. Since s = −1, either K1/K2 > τ1 or K2/K1 > τ2, i.e., at least one plant
is always above its attraction threshold.3 This is why Figure 5a, b, d, e are blank, because there are no
parameters that satisfy inequalities that define these four panels. With respect to plant equilibria, there
are three mutually exclusive possible outcomes of plant competition.
First, the missing plant cannot invade the other plant monoculture equilibrium and plant coexistence
is not possible. These are situations where generalized isoclines do not intersect nor overlap, and the
dynamics globally converge toward the monoculture equilibrium of the plant that can invade (to E1 in
Figure 5c, and to E2 in panel g).
Second, both plants can invade one another and the generalized isoclines intersect in one of the two
sectors. Thus, both plants coexist either at the globally stable equilibrium EI (panel f) at which exploiters
specialize on plant 1, or globally stable equilibrium EII (panel h) at which exploiters specialize on plant
2.
Third, generalized isoclines partially overlap along the switching line (Figure 5i), so that there is globally
stable equilibrium ES at which animals behave as generalists with intermediate preferences for plant 1
given by u¯1 in (20).
3.2. Exploitation (s = −1) and strong inter-specific plant competition (c1c2 > 1)
Since s = −1, there are no parameters satisfying K2/K1 < τ2 and K1/K2 < τ1 exactly as in the previous
case of weak competition and there are 8 qualitative cases for isoclines intersections (Figure 6).
Due to strong competition, stable plant coexistence is impossible in sector I or sector II, but when both
attraction thresholds are met (i.e., K1/K2 > τ1 and K2/K1 > τ2), the isoclines partially overlap along the
switching line and plants can coexist at equilibrium ES where exploiters behave as adaptive generalists
with intermediate preference u¯1 for plant 1. This state of coexistence can be locally or globally stable,
depending on whether invasion thresholds are met, as we will see next.
3 The case where both K1/K2 < τ1 and K2/K1 < τ2 is not possible because then 1 < τ1τ2 = (1 −
A
r1
)(1 − A
r2
) < 1, a
contradiction.
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Figure 5. Plant generalized isoclines (plant 1: black, plant 2: gray) under exploitation (s = −1) and weak competition
(c1c2 < 1). Isoclines intersect the dashed switching line (6) at four points a, b, p, q. Animals specialize on plant 1 (2) in
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If neither of the two invasion thresholds are met (Figure 6e), equilibrium ES is locally stable and
depending on initial conditions there are three possible outcomes for plant population dynamics: (i)
monoculture equilibrium E1 where exploiters specialize on plant 1 (u1 = 1) and plant 2 is excluded, (ii)
monoculture equilibrium E2 where exploiters specialize on plant 2 (u1 = 0) and plant 1 is excluded, or
(iii) plant coexistence equilibrium ES.
If only one plant invasion threshold is met, equilibrium ES stays locally stable and there is another
monoculture equilibrium for the plant that meets its invasion threshold (i.e., E1 in panel f, or E2 in panel
h).
If both plants are above their invasion thresholds, ES is globally stable (Figure 6i), despite of intra-
specific competition being stronger than inter-specific (c1c2 > 1) that would not permit stable coexistence
in the standard LV competition model.
Like in standard LV models with strong competition, there are parameter values for which generalized
isoclines intersect in a single unstable equilibrium, leading to the well known bi-stable outcome where
plant 1 or plant 2 wins depending on initial conditions (Figure 6b,d).
3.3. Mutualism (s = 1) and weak inter-specific plant competition (c1c2 < 1)
All possible qualitative intersections of isoclines under mutualism and weak inter-specific plant competition
are shown in Figure 7. As inter-specific competition is weak (c1c2 < 1), plant invasion thresholds are
smaller than attraction thresholds (γ1 < τ1 and γ2 < τ2) and there are no parameter values such that
K1/K2 > τ1 and K2/K1 > τ2, i.e., panel i in Figure 7 is empty.4
There are important differences in plant competition dynamics under mutualism when compared to the
exploitative case (cf. Figure 7 vs. Figure 5). The main difference is that the interior equilibrium ES, when
it exists, is unstable for mutualism (Figure 7a, b, d, e). As this is the only plant coexistence equilibrium at
which animals behave as generalists, this predicts that mutualists will always behave as specialists when
plants are at a locally stable equilibrium, whether both plants coexist (Figure 7b, d, e, f, h) or not (Figure
7a, c, g). The other important difference between mutualists vs. exploiters is that mutualism leads to
alternative locally stable plant equilibria (Figure 7a, b, d, e). Where the plant dynamics converge depends
on initial plant population densities, and there are three general cases that we describe next.
First, if neither plant invasion threshold is met (Figure 7a) initial conditions lead towards monoculture
equilibrium E1 or E2, where mutualists specialize on plant 1 or plant 2 respectively. This outcome is
analogous to the bi-stable case of the standard LV competition model when competition is strong (c1c2 > 1)
and the interior equilibrium is a saddle point. But here, instead, competition is weak (c1c2 < 1), and bi-
stability arises because equilibrium ES on the switching line behaves like a saddle point. We described
similar outcomes of mutual exclusion in previous obligatory mutualism models (Revilla and Křivan, 2016),
where plants competed exclusively for pollinator preferences (i.e., c1 = c2 = 0).
Second, when plant 1 (2) meets its invasion threshold and the other plant 2 (1) does not, initial condi-
tions lead either to a monoculture of plant 1 (2) or to stable coexistence of both plants with mutualists
specializing on plant 2 (1) (e.g., E1 or EII in Figure 7b; E2 or EI in panel d).
Third, when both plants are above their invasion thresholds there are locally stable equilibria in both sec-
tors, and initial conditions determine whether coexistence takes place at equilibrium EI where mutualists
specialize on plant 1, or at EII where they specialize on plant 2 (Figure 7e).
3.4. Mutualism (s = 1) and strong inter-specific plant competition (c1c2 > 1)
When animals are mutualists (s = 1) and inter-specific plant competition is strong (c1c2 > 1) attraction
thresholds are smaller than invasion thresholds (γi > τi, i = 1, 2) and there are no parameters satisfying
K2/K1 > γ2 and K1/K2 > γ1 (i.e., panels e, f, h and i in Figure 8 are empty). Moreover, plant coexistence
4Indeed inequalities K1/K2 > τ1 and K2/K1 > τ2 imply that τ1τ2 = (1 +
sA
r1
)(1 + sA
r2
) < 1 which is false under mutualism
when s = 1 .
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Figure 7. Plant generalized isoclines under mutualism (s = 1) and weak competition (c1c2 < 1). Notation like in Figure 5.
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is impossible (Figure 8) which is in a sharp contrast with the case of exploiters (Figure 6) where plant
coexistence is possible depending on initial conditions.
When isoclines intersect in sector I or II, and do not overlap along the switching line, one plant competi-
tively excludes the other plant, and plant population dynamics are bi-stable (Figure 8b, d). These bi-stable
scenarios can be attributed entirely to strong inter-specific competition, like in standard LV competition
models. But again, as in the case of exploitation with strong competition, bi-stability leads to mutualists
specializing either on plant 1, or on plant 2.
Bi-stability can also be caused by instability of equilibrium ES when the two plant isoclines partially
overlap (Figure 8a), similarly to the case where competition is weak as discussed in the previous Section
3.3.
4. Discussion
In this article we study effects of adaptive exploiters or mutualists on two competing plant popula-
tion dynamics, and on animal preference for plants. For plant population dynamics described by the
Lotka–Volterra competition model we provide a complete classification (Figures 5–8, Appendix C) of
coexistence states when plants interact either with adaptive exploiters or mutualists that have fixed popu-
lation densities. This classification is based on comparing plant invasion (γi given in (14)) and attraction
(τi given in (18)) thresholds. These critical numbers capture the combined influences of (i) plant–animal
interaction type (exploitation vs. mutualism), (ii) inter-specific plant competition (weak vs. strong), and
(iii) indirect effects between plants mediated by changes in animal preferences.
Model analysis leads to the following general predictions:
1. Under exploitation and weak competition a globally stable plant coexistence equilibrium exists when
carrying capacities are not very unbalanced. At plant coexistence equilibrium exploiters are specialist
when at low densities while at high densities they are generalists. Plant coexistence is possible even
if neither of the two plants is viable as a monoculture.
2. Plant coexistence under exploitation and strong competition is possible but conditional, i.e., depends
on initial conditions. Up to three plant equilibria can co-exist. Plant coexistence is possible only
due to adaptive behavior of exploiters when exploiters behave as adaptive generalists.
3. Plant coexistence under mutualism and weak competition can be global or conditional on initial
plant population densities. Under mutualism animals always specialize on the more profitable plant
only.
4. Plant coexistence under mutualism and strong competition is impossible.
An important special case when plants do not compete directly (c1 = c2 = 0), e.g., when plants grow
in separate pots, or plants are separated by a fence or a road (Geslin et al., 2017), was analyzed in
Křivan (2003b) for exploiters. In this case plant 1 (plant 2) isocline is vertical (horizontal) in sectors I
and II, invasion thresholds are zero so that they play no role at all, and attraction thresholds simplify to
τ1 =
e2
e1
(
1 + sA
r2
)
and τ2 =
e1
e2
(
1 + sA
r1
)
. In the case of exploitation (s = −1) the only possible outcome
is either global extinction (when exploiter density is too high) or global coexistence where animals can
be specialists (when exploiter density is low) or generalists (when exploiter density is intermediate). In
the case of mutualism (s = 1) possible outcomes always predict coexistence, including alternative stable
states, as shown in Figure 7e, f, h.
We stress here that our predictions concern a small community, and it would be incorrect to extrapolate
them to larger plant–animal interaction networks without proper consideration of model (1) limitations
and assumptions (see section Model assumption below). For example, our model predicts that both plants
can coexist with generalist exploiters but not with generalists mutualists, while there is empirical evidence
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that insect pollinators are more generalist than insect herbivores (Fontaine et al., 2009). Disagreement
arises, e.g., because our Lotka–Volterra model does not consider competition for plants among the animals
that are kept at fixed density. When mutualism is modeled under explicit consumer–resource dynamics
where animal population densities change (Valdovinos et al., 2013; Revilla and Křivan, 2016), resource
depletion (e.g., nectar consumption) can promote mutualist generalism, countering the tendency towards
exclusive specialization on the most profitable plant.
Another counter-intuitive prediction is that exploitation coupled with flexible foraging enables indirect
facilitation between plants. Once again, this is due to fixed animal population densities, because increase
in one plant population density does not lead to increase in exploiter population density, a necessary con-
dition for apparent competition (Holt, 1977) to occur. Even models that consider coupled prey–predator
dynamics predict important positive effects between preys due to predator switching (Abrams and Mat-
suda, 1996). Thus by coexisting, plants share exploitation costs, which leads to facilitation (i.e., higher
equilibrium densities). Such indirect positive effect can be extreme, i.e., plants that cannot tolerate ex-
ploitation alone can survive when sharing exploitative stress with another plant (e.g., Figure 3). In the
case of mutualism, flexible preferences gives rise to competition for preferences. This increases competitive
asymmetries already present between the plants (Figure 4). In addition, indirect facilitation between plants
that share mutualists (Waser and Real, 1979) is prevented from happening by the animals having fixed
densities. In this respect, experiments show that competition between plants for pollinator preferences
can overcome such facilitation effects (Ghazoul, 2006).
Population dynamics and adaptive animal preferences
To model effects of adaptive animal preferences on population dynamics of two competing plant species,
we combine the Lotka–Volterra competitive model with a behavioral model that describes changes in
animal preferences for plants. This is a common scenario in plant communities interacting with guilds
of herbivores, parasites, pollinators or seed dispersers (Melián et al., 2009; Sauve et al., 2016; Bronstein,
2015). We assume that animal preferences for plants track instantaneously current plant population
densities which, in turn, influence plant population dynamics. To model this feedback, we assume that
animal preferences maximize animal fitness at current plant population densities. As optimal animal
preferences when both plants are equally profitable are not uniquely given, the resulting plant population
dynamics are described by a Lotka–Volterra differential inclusion (e.g., Colombo and Křivan, 1993; Křivan,
1996, 1997, 2007; Křivan et al., 2008). We analyze this model by generalizing the concept of isoclines which
allows us to provide a complete classification of all plant equilibria. To this end, we split the plant phase
space into two sectors (Figures 2a, c, e and 5–8). The boundary that separates these sectors is called the
switching line because animals switch their preferences for plants when plant population numbers cross
this line. Along the switching line animal fitness is independent from animal preferences because payoffs
from both plants are the same. Inside the sectors, animals specialize on one plant only5. Thus, plant
isoclines inside each sector coincide with the classical isoclines for the Lotka–Volterra competition model.
In this article we define generalized plant isoclines that are formed by sector-wise pieces of isoclines that are
connected with segments of the switching line (Figures 5–8). Thus, globally, generalized plant isoclines are
piece-wise linear, which leads to multiple isocline intersections and multiple steady states. In particular,
the segments of the two plant isoclines that are subsets of the switching line can partially overlap (Figure
5i; Figure 6e, f, h, i; Figure 7a, b, d, e; Figure 8a). If so, we show that plant population dynamics
have a unique equilibrium in this overlapping segment (e.g., Figure 2b, c). This equilibrium is either
locally stable when animals are exploiters or unstable when animals are mutualists. There are important
differences between plant equilibria in the switching line and those that are inside sectors because animals
5Similar concepts, called isodars and isolegs, are used in the habitat selection theory (Pimm and Rosenzweig, 1981; Rosen-
zweig, 1981; Křivan and Sirot, 2002; Morris, 2003; Křivan and Vrkoč, 2007) where distribution of a single population is
studied as a function of the number of individuals of that population. In this article distribution of animals depends not
only on animal population density, but also on plant densities.
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are specialists inside sectors, but they are generalists at the equilibrium that is in the switching line.
The configuration of generalized isoclines depends on plant invasion thresholds (14) and attraction
thresholds (18). Invasion thresholds γi determine whether the missing plant species can invade the other
plant monoculture at the equilibrium. For the standard Lotka–Volterra competition model with fixed
animal preferences, coexistence as well as global dynamics can be predicted entirely in terms of invasion
thresholds. However, when interactions between plants and animals are adaptive, we have to consider
animal preferences which leads to non-linear generalized isoclines, and the concept of attraction thresholds.
Attraction threshold τi determines whether the plant coexistence equilibrium at the switching line, where
animals behave as plant generalists, locally attracts or repels orbits. This is analogous to the invasion
threshold which determines whether the boundary equilibria attract or repel orbits. Attraction thresholds
depend on animal density, inter-specific competition, and on payoffs (ei) animals obtain from plants.
These payoffs define animal fitness which is a function of plant densities. Despite the fact that we assume
fixed animal densities, animal preferences (i.e., animal behavioral traits) change with changes in plant
numbers. In other words, we observe indirect interactions between plants mediated by changes in animal
preferences (i.e., trait-mediated indirect interactions between plants sensu Bolker et al., 2003). Thus,
attraction thresholds capture the combined effects of inter-specific plant competition and behaviorally-
mediated indirect effects, and their positions relative to invasion thresholds determine global interaction
dynamics as summarized at the start of the discussion section.
Model assumptions
The plant–animal model assumes constant animal density. This allows us to focus on behavior-mediated
indirect interactions between plants not affected by simultaneous density-mediated interactions caused by
changes in animal density (i.e., apparent competition and facilitation). This is reasonable assumption if
animal populations are regulated mainly by external factors not explicitly considered. A good example
is the case of common bees with large managed populations (Geslin et al., 2017), spilling over natural
communities. Constant animal density is also enforced in short term experiments that study the effect
of foraging behavior on plant success (Fontaine et al., 2005). Another plausible scenario is that the
animal population dynamics is very slow when compared with plants due to differences in generation
time (e.g., ungulate recruitment being slower than grass regrowth). An important prediction of the
model is that exploitation favors animal generalism, while mutualism favors specialization. When animal
population dynamics are considered, animal benefits must decrease due to intra-specific competition for
plant resources, favoring generalism over specialization, even under mutualism (Revilla and Křivan, 2016).
Another important assumption is that animal adaptation is much faster than plant population dynamics.
This requires that changes of foraging behavior occur within individual lifetimes, e.g., highly mobile
consumers dispersing between plant species, like in the ideal free distribution (Křivan, 2003b). The
assumption of fast adaptation can be relaxed by modeling preference dynamics explicitly using, e.g.,
replicator equation (Kondoh, 2003). In Revilla and Křivan (2016) we showed that qualitative predictions
related to mutualist generalism vs. specialism are preserved even when adaptation runs on a similar time
scale as population dynamics. However, when adaptation was much slower than population dynamics,
predictions frequently diverged due to extreme dependence on animal initial preferences. For example,
if animals initially strongly prefer one plant over the other despite the fact that such behavior is not
optimal, the initially preferred plant can die out before animal preferences could change. In addition, when
adaptation occurs over multiple generations, specialization or generalism also depends on the evolution of
fitness related traits such as conversion efficiencies (ei), which scale interactions with payoffs. Parameters
like these depend on complex morphological and physiological constraints, and they generally relate to one
another via non-linear trade-offs (Egas et al., 2004). Accounting for long term change of these parameters
requires different approaches (e.g., adaptive dynamics, Kisdi 2002; Egas et al. 2004; Rueffler et al. 2006).
Finally, we only consider facultative mutualism because many plants have multiple pollinators or seed
dispersers (Melián et al., 2009). Obligate mutualism can be modeled with Lotka–Volterra equations
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(Vandermeer and Boucher, 1978), but adaptive preference rules out coexistence trivially because mutualists
interact with the more profitable plant only and the less profitable plant will die. Obligate mutualisms
are better studied using mechanistic models (Revilla and Křivan, 2016, 2018), that predict coexistence
depending on initial conditions because of mutualistic Allee effects (Bronstein, 2015).
Conditional coexistence and alternative plant stable states
The interplay between plant competition and animal adaptation gives rise to complex plant popula-
tion–animal preference dynamics. As plant isoclines are non-linear (e.g., Figure 7) multiple equilibria can
co-exist. This has important implications for the diversity of communities under perturbations (Yan and
Zhang, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). On the one hand, perturbations in plant abundances can lead to loss of
coexistence under exploitation and strong competition, i.e. coexistence conditioned by initial conditions
(e.g., Figure 6e, f, h). On the other hand, they can trigger transitions between alternative stable states of
coexistence when mutualism and weak inter-plant competition combine (e.g., Figure 7e).
Conditional coexistence and coexistence at alternative stable states are common predictions of models
that combine positive and negative density-dependent interactions (e.g., Hernandez, 1998; Holland and
DeAngelis, 2010; Revilla and Encinas-Viso, 2015). In the present model, however, plants always interact
negatively due to inter-specific competition, and additional positive or negative effects arise due to adaptive
preference of common exploiters or mutualists. Since animal densities are fixed, these indirect effects are
behavior-mediated, but triggered by changes in plant densities. It is very important to remark that such
abundance–preference feedbacks between trophic levels leads to very different predictions when compared
to abundance–abundance feedbacks between trophic levels. In this latter case where animals respond
numerically to plant densities, exploitation leads to apparent competition (Holt, 1977) and mutualism
to apparent mutualism (or apparent facilitation) between plants, which respectively opposes and favors
coexistence (Sauve et al., 2016). When animal preferences respond to plant densities, exploitation leads to
a competitive release that promotes stable plant coexistence (Křivan, 1997, 2003a) while mutualism leads
to competition for mutualists preferences between plants that destabilizes plant coexistence and leads to
plant exclusion (Revilla and Křivan, 2018).
In this article we showed that conditional plant coexistence is expected in scenarios where generalist
exploiters regulate strongly competing plants (i.e., c1c2 > 1, Figure 6e, f, h, i). On the other hand,
outcomes like coexistence at alternative stable states are expected between weakly competing plants (i.e.,
c1c2 < 1) that are regulated by specialized mutualists. How relevant these predictions are in the real world
depends on how widespread are situations where intra-specific competition is stronger than inter-specific,
and vice-versa. On the one hand, meta-analyses suggest that intra- and inter-specific effects are too similar
to be discerned (Gurevitch et al., 1992), or that intra-specific effects are actually much stronger than inter-
specific (i.e., c1c2 ≤ 1; Adler et al., 2018). However, recent pair-wise competition experiments (Sheppard,
2019) suggest that inter-specific competition can be strong (i.e., c1c2 > 1). Such uncertainty is rooted in
the fact that these surveys assume models like (1) that treat competition phenomenologically, and there
can be multiple underlying factors that can lead to strong net competition. For example, competition
can be strengthened by allelopathy (Inderjit and Del Moral, 1997), which is decidedly stronger against
non-specifics compared to con-specifics.
It will be interesting to explore to what extent our conclusions can be extrapolated to larger commu-
nities, consisting of several animal and plant species. For such diverse scenarios coexistence must result
from intricate balances between multiple positive and negative effects (Melián et al., 2009; Georgelin and
Loeuille, 2014; Mougi and Kondoh, 2014; Revilla and Křivan, 2016), where density- and behaviorally-
mediated effects mix up. The analytical study of combined exploitative and mutualist effects is more
difficult. For an illustration, let us consider a second exploiter or mutualist. This modification of model
(1) will result in two switching lines (one for each animal species), three sectors and piece-wise continuous
generalized isoclines that will consist of five segments. Mathematical analysis given in this article can
be extended to describe this case as well, but as the number of species increases, complete mathematical
20
classification will be intractable due to combinatorial complexity of possible outcomes. In these cases
simulation approaches can be useful for studying the likelihood of multiple equilibria, as a function of
competition intensity and the proportion of exploitative vs. mutualistic interactions (e.g., Melián et al.
2009).
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A. Plant population dynamics
The switching line e1P1 = e2P2 of the animal splits the positive quadrant into
sector I = {(P1, P2) | e1P1 > e2P2, P1 ≥ 0, P2 ≥ 0}
and
sector II = {(P1, P2) | e1P1 < e2P2, P1 ≥ 0, P2 ≥ 0}.
In sector I animals interact with plant 1 only and plant population dynamics [system (1) in the main
text] are
dP1
dt
=
(
r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
)
+ sA
)
P1
dP2
dt
=
(
r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
))
P2,
(A.1)
whereas in sector II animals interact with plant 2 only and population dynamics are
dP1
dt
=
(
r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
))
P1
dP2
dt
=
(
r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
)
+ sA
)
P2.
(A.2)
Along the switching line e1P1 = e2P2 animal strategy is not uniquely defined and population dynamics
satisfy
dP1
dt
=r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
)
P1 + su1P1A
dP2
dt
=r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
)
P2 + su2P2A
(u1, u2) ∈{(v1, v2) | v1 + v2 = 1, v1 ≥ 0, v2 ≥ 0}.
(A.3)
A.1. Plant dynamics in sectors I and II
From (A.1) and (A.2), the isoclines of plant 1 in sectors I and II are
P1 + c2P2 = K1
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
(A.4)
P1 + c2P2 = K1, (A.5)
respectively. We observe that plant 1 isocline exists in sector I iff r1 + sA > 0. For mutualists (s = 1)
this is always the case, but for exploiters this holds only if A < r1 which we assume now. The segment of
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plant 1 isocline in sector I given in (A.4) intersects the P1 axis at E1 [given by (9) in the main text] and
switching line (6) at
b =
(
e2K1(r1 + sA)
r1(e2 + c2e1)
,
e1K1(r1 + sA)
r1(e2 + c2e1)
)
, (A.6)
and the segment of plant 1 isocline in sector II given in (A.5) intersects the P2 axis and the switching line
at points
k1 =
(
0 ,
K1
c2
)
(A.7)
a =
(
e2K1
e2 + c2e1
,
e1K1
e2 + c2e1
)
, (A.8)
respectively.
Similarly from (A.1) and (A.2), plant 2 isocline in sector I is
P2 + c1P1 = K2 (A.9)
and in sector II
P2 + c1P1 = K2
(
1 +
sA
r2
)
, (A.10)
respectively. Once again, plant 2 isocline exists in sector II iff r2 + sA > 0. Isocline (A.9) intersects the
P1 axis and the switching line at points
k2 =
(
K2
c1
, 0
)
(A.11)
q =
(
e2K2
e1 + c1e2
,
e1K2
e1 + c1e2
)
, (A.12)
respectively. Isocline (A.10) intersects the P2 axis at E2 [given by (10) in the main text] and the switching
line at
p =
(
e2K2(r2 + sA)
r2(e1 + c1e2)
,
e1K2(r2 + sA)
r2(e1 + c1e2)
)
. (A.13)
Isoclines position in sector I is determined by position of k2 with respect to E1 on the P1 axis, and
position of b with respect to q along the switching line. The following statements apply in this sector
k2 > E1 ⇐⇒
K2
K1
> c1
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
≡ γ2 (A.14)
q > b ⇐⇒
K2
K1
>
(
e1 + c1e2
e2 + c2e1
)(
1 +
sA
r1
)
≡ τ2. (A.15)
If both conditions above are true, plant 2 isocline is above plant 1 isocline in sector I and there is no interior
equilibrium in this sector (e.g., Figure 2c, sector I). If both conditions are false, then plant 1 isocline is
above plant 2 isocline in sector I (Figure 5c, sector I). If (A.14) is true and (A.15) false, isoclines intersect
at point EI [given by (13) in the main text], and because plant 1 isocline is steeper than plant 2 isocline
( 1
c2
> c1) this equilibrium is stable (e.g., Figure 5f, sector I). If (A.14) is false and (A.15) true, isoclines
intersect again but because plant 2 isocline is steeper than plant 1 isocline ( 1
c2
< c1), EI is unstable (e.g.,
Figure 6d, sector I).
For sector II we compare k1 with E2 on the P2 axis, and a with p along the switching line. We obtain
k1 > E2 ⇐⇒
K1
K2
> c2
(
1 +
sA
r2
)
≡ γ1 (A.16)
a > p ⇐⇒
K1
K2
>
(
e2 + c2e1
e1 + c1e2
)(
1 +
sA
r2
)
≡ τ1. (A.17)
25
If both conditions above are true (e.g., Figure 2a,c) or both are false (e.g., Figure 5g), there is no interior
equilibrium in sector II because the two plant isoclines do not intersect there. If (A.16) is true and (A.17)
false, isoclines intersect at the point EII [given by (17) in the main text], and because plant 1 isocline is
steeper than plant 2 isocline ( 1
c2
> c1) the equilibrium is stable (e.g., Figure 2e, sector II). And if (A.16)
is false and (A.17) true, isoclines intersect and because plant 2 isocline is steeper than plant 1 isocline
( 1
c2
< c1), EII is unstable (e.g., Figure 6b, sector II).
A.2. Plant population dynamics along the switching line
Here we are interested in plant population dynamics at the switching line. Let n = (e1,−e2) be a
perpendicular vector to the switching line e1P1 = e2P2 and let us denote the right hand sides of (A.1) and
(A.2) by f I and f II, respectively. The dynamics close to the switching line depend on the following scalar
products
〈n, f I〉 = e1P1
{
(r1 + sA)− r2 + P1
K1r2(e1 + c1e2)−K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
e2K1K2
}
〈n, f II〉 = e1P1
{
r1 − (r2 + sA) + P1
K1r2(e1 + c1e2)−K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
e2K1K2
}
.
(A.18)
There are four possibilities (Filippov, 1988; Colombo and Křivan, 1993):
1. If 〈n, f I〉 < 0 and 〈n, f II〉 < 0 trajectories are crossing the switching line in direction from sector I
to sector II.
2. If 〈n, f I〉 > 0 and 〈n, f II〉 > 0 trajectories are crossing the switching line in direction from sector II
to sector I.
3. If 〈n, f I〉 < 0 and 〈n, f II〉 > 0 trajectories do not cross the switching line and they have to stay for
some positive time on the switching line. This is called the sliding regime.
4. If 〈n, f I〉 > 0 and 〈n, f II〉 < 0 trajectories that start at such points are not uniquely defined. They
can move along the switching line for some time and then leave the line either to sector I or to sector
II. This is called the repelling regime.
We observe that
〈n, f I〉 = 〈n, f II〉+ 2se1P1A.
Thus, when s = 1, 〈n, f II〉 > 0 implies 〈n, f I〉 > 0 which excludes the sliding regime. Similarly, when
s = −1, 〈n, f II〉 < 0 implies 〈n, f I〉 < 0 which excludes the repelling regime.
To analyze all possible situations under which sliding or repelling regime occurs, using (A.6), (A.8),
(A.12), and (A.13) we rewrite (A.18) as
〈n, f I〉 =
e1P1 {K1r2(e1 + c1e2) [P1 − q1]−K2r1(e2 + c2e1) [P1 − b1]}
e2K1K2
〈n, f II〉 =
e1P1 {K1r2(e1 + c1e2) [P1 − p1]−K2r1(e2 + c2e1) [P1 − a1]}
e2K1K2
.
(A.19)
For exploiters (s = −1) b < a and p < q so that there are four possibilities for isoclines overlap at the
switching line. All these possibilities together with the overlap segment of the two generalized isoclines
are listed in Table A.1. Moreover, scalar products given in (A.19) show that in the overlap segment plant
dynamics are in the sliding regime.
Similarly, for mutualists (s = 1) b > a and p > q and again there are four possibilities where the
two isoclines overlap at the switching line (Table A.1). However, in this case, the overlap segment repels
trajectories.
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Cases 〈n, f I〉 〈n, f II〉 overlap ES dynamics at the
segment overlap segment
s = −1 p1 < b1 < a1 < q1 <0 >0 ba Yes sliding regime
b1 < p1 < q1 < a1 <0 >0 pq Yes sliding regime
p1 < b1 < q1 < a1 <0 >0 bq Yes sliding regime
b1 < p1 < a1 < q1 <0 >0 pa Yes sliding regime
p1 < q1 < b1 < a1 >0 >0 no overlap No crossing from sector II to I
b1 < a1 < p1 < q1 <0 <0 no overlap No crossing from sector I to II
s = 1 q1 < a1 < b1 < p1 >0 <0 ab Yes repelling regime
a1 < q1 < p1 < b1 >0 <0 qp Yes repelling regime
q1 < a1 < p1 < b1 >0 <0 ap Yes repelling regime
a1 < q1 < b1 < p1 >0 <0 qb Yes repelling regime
q1 < p1 < a1 < b1 >0 >0 no overlap No crossing from sector II to I
a1 < b1 < q1 < p1 <0 <0 no overlap No crossing from sector I to II
Table A.1. List of all possible overlaps of generalized isoclines along the switching line.
A.2.1. Equilibrium ES
Now we look for equilibria of model (1) and (5) in the switching line. Every non-trivial equilibrium there
must satisfy
e1P1 =e2P2
0 =r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
)
P1 + su1P1A
0 =r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
)
P2 + s(1− u1)P2A.
These equations have a single non-trivial solution that gives equilibrium ES given in (19) and the corre-
sponding preference for plant 1, u¯1, given in (20). For ES to be feasible, u¯1 must be between 0 and 1.
This happens iff either (21) or (22) holds. Using (A.6) and (A.12), plant 1 population equilibrium given
in (19) can be written as a convex combination of points b1 and q1
P¯1 =
[
K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
]
b1 +
[
K1r2(e1 + c1e2)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
]
q1,
which shows that b1 < P¯1 < q1.
Similarly, using (A.8) and (A.13), plant 1 population equilibrium becomes
P¯1 =
[
K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
]
a1 +
[
K1r2(e1 + c1e2)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
]
p1
which shows that p1 < P¯1 < a1. It follows from Table A.1 that equilibrium ES is in the sliding regime
where the plant generalized isoclines overlap. Now we study stability of ES.
First we consider the exploitation case where s = −1. Table A.1 shows that at points where the
generalized isoclines overlap, trajectories are driven toward the switching line from both sectors. In
this case trajectories cannot cross the switching line inside the isoclines overlap segment. Thus, once
a trajectory reaches the overlap segment, it must move along it, i.e., e1P1(t) = e2P2(t). This means
that when the trajectory moves along the overlap segment, preferences for plants (u1, u2) must satisfy
e1P
′
1(t) = e2P
′
2(t), i.e.,
e1
[
r1
(
1−
P1 + c2P2
K1
)
+ su1A
]
= e2
[
r2
(
1−
P2 + c1P1
K2
+ s(1− u1)A
)]
,
27
where we used the fact that e1P1(t) = e2P2(t). The corresponding preference for plant plant 1 along the
trajectory is
u1 =
e2K2(sAe1K1 + c2e1P1r1 + e2r1(P1 −K1))− e1K1r2(c1e2P1 + e1P1 − e2K2)
sAe2K1K2(e1 + e2)
.
With this preference for plant 1, plant population dynamics in the sliding regime are described by the
logistic equation
dP1
dt
=
e1(r1 + r2 + sA)
e1 + e2
[
1−
(
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
e2K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)
)
P1
]
P1, (A.20)
with equilibrium P¯1 corresponding to ES = (P¯1, e1/e2P¯1). This shows that equilibrium ES is locally stable,
because trajectories close to this equilibrium are attracted from both sector I and II toward the switching
line (Table A.1) and they converge along the switching line to the equilibrium.
Second, we consider stability of ES for mutualisms when s = 1. Table A.1 shows that the overlap
segment of the two isoclines repels nearby trajectories, equilibrium ES is unstable. Moreover, trajectories
that start at the overlap of the two plant generalized isoclines are not uniquely defined, because they can
leave this segment of the switching line either to sector I, or to sector II.
B. Effect of parameters on equilibria
Using (7) and (8) for sector I, equilibrium densities at EI (13) take the form
Pˆ1 =
H1 − c2K2
1− c1c2
, Pˆ2 =
K2 − c1H1
1− c1c2
,
where H1 = K1
(
1 + sA
r1
)
. Thus, ∂Pˆi/∂r2, ∂Pˆi/∂e1, ∂Pˆi/∂e2 (i = 1, 2) are all zero, and
∂Pˆ1
∂r1
=
−sK1A
r2
1
(1− c1c2)
,
∂Pˆ2
∂r1
=
sc1K1A
r2
1
(1− c1c2)
,
∂Pˆ1
∂A
=
sK1
r1(1− c1c2)
,
∂Pˆ2
∂A
=
−sK1c1
r1(1− c1c2)
,
∂Pˆ1
∂K1
=
1
1− c1c2
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
,
∂Pˆ2
∂K1
=
−c1
1− c1c2
(
1 +
sA
r1
)
,
∂Pˆ1
∂K2
=
−c2
1− c1c2
,
∂Pˆ2
∂K2
=
1
1− c1c2
,
∂Pˆ1
∂c1
=
c2Pˆ1
1− c1c2
,
∂Pˆ2
∂c1
=
−Pˆ1
1− c1c2
,
∂Pˆ1
∂c2
=
−Pˆ2
1− c1c2
,
∂Pˆ2
∂c2
=
c1Pˆ2
1− c1c2
.
We remark that because r1+sA > 0 is required for EI to be feasible, the sign of
∂Pˆ1
∂K1
and ∂Pˆ2
∂K1
is independent
of 1 + sA
r1
. Parameter effects on EII are obtained analogously.
At equilibrium ES (19) plant densities take the form
P¯1 = e2G , P¯2 = e1G,
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where G =
K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
. This quantity varies with parameters as
∂G
∂r1
=
(
K1
K2
− τ1
){
r2(e1 + c1e2)K1K
2
2
[K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂G
∂K1
=
{
r1(r1 + r2 + sA)(e2 + c2e1)K
2
2
[K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂G
∂c1
= −
{
e2r2(r1 + r2 + sA)K
2
1K2
[K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂G
∂A
= s
{
K1K2
K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)
}
∂G
∂e1
= −
{
K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)(K1r2 +K2r1c2)
[K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
,
where the quantities between curly braces are positive (because feasibility of ES requires r1+r2+sA > 0).
Thus ∂G
∂K1
> 0, ∂G
∂c1
< 0, and ∂G
∂e1
< 0. Moreover, ∂G
∂A
< 0 under exploitation (s = −1) and ∂G
∂A
> 0 under
mutualism (s = 1). Under exploitation ∂G
∂r1
> 0 because ES is feasible iff both plants are above their
attraction thresholds (i.e., K1/K2 > τ1 and K2/K1 > τ2). Conversely, ∂G∂r1 < 0 under mutualism. Since
P¯i = ejG where i, j = 1, 2 but i 6= j, we can conclude
∂P¯i
∂K1
> 0,
∂P¯i
∂c1
< 0,
∂P¯i
∂r1
{
> 0 exploitation
< 0 mutualism,
∂P¯i
∂A
{
< 0 exploitation
> 0 mutualism,
,
i.e., both plant densities change in the same direction (i.e., ∂P¯1/∂P¯2 > 0) when r1,K1, c1, A change. Now
when e1 varies we have
∂P¯1
∂e1
= e2
∂G
∂e1
< 0, but
∂P¯2
∂e1
= G+ e1
∂G
∂r1
=
e2K1K2(K2r1 + c1K1r2)(r1 + r2 + sA)
[K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
which is positive. Mutatis mutandis ∂P¯1
∂e2
> 0 and ∂P¯2
∂e2
< 0. Thus, when e1 or e2 change, plant densities
change in opposite directions (i.e., ∂P¯1/∂P¯2 < 0).
Finally the derivatives of generalist preference u¯1 (20) at ES are
∂u¯1
∂r1
=
{
r2(e2 + c2e1)K1 u¯1
r1 [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
}
∂u¯1
∂K1
= −s
{
r1r2K2(e1 + c1e2)(e2 + c2e1)(r1 + r2 + sA)
A [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂u¯1
∂c1
= −s
{
r1r2e2K1K2(e2 + c2e1)(r1 + r2 + sA)
A [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂u¯1
∂e1
= s(c1c2 − 1)
{
e2r1r2K1K2(r1 + r2 + sA)
A [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
2
}
∂u¯1
∂A
= s
(
K1
K2
−
e2 + c2e1
e1 + c1e2
){
r1r2K2(e1 + c1e2)
A2 [K1r2(e1 + c1e2) +K2r1(e2 + c2e1)]
}
,
where the quantities between curly braces are positive (because feasibility of ES requires r1+r2+sA > 0).
Thus ∂u¯1
∂r1
> 0 trivially. Under exploitation (s = −1), ∂u¯1
∂K1
> 0, and ∂u¯1
∂c1
> 0. And under mutualism (s = 1),
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∂u¯1
∂K1
< 0 and ∂u¯1
∂c1
< 0. The sign of ∂u¯1
∂e1
depends on interaction type and strength of competition as follows
∂u¯1
∂e1


> 0 for exploitation & c1c2 < 1
< 0 for exploitation & c1c2 > 1
< 0 for mutualism & c1c2 < 1
> 0 for mutualism & c1c2 > 1
and the sign of ∂u¯1/∂A depends on interaction type and the sign of the
K1
K2
− e2+c2e1
e1+c1e2
. Since u1 and u2 vary
in opposite directions, the derivatives of u¯1 with respect to r2,K2, c2, e2 are of opposite signs compared
with the corresponding derivatives with respect r1,K1, c1, e1 above.
C. Classification of equilibria
Table A.2 summarizes our previous analyzes given in Appendices A.1 and A.2, and lists all feasible (i.e.,
non-negative) stable equilibria for system (1) under exploitation (s = −1) or mutualism (s = 1), and weak
(c1c2 < 1) or strong (c1c2 > 1) competition. Empty (∅) cells indicate that no parameter combination
satisfies row or column conditions. Cells with only one equilibrium indicate that this equilibrium is globally
stable. Cells with multiple equilibria indicate that these equilibria are locally stable. There are 56 non-
empty cells in Table A.2, each of them corresponding to a unique isocline configuration. The configurations
shown in Figures 5–8 are indicated by figure number and panel. Out of these 56 configurations, there are
11 possible combinations (i.e., E1, E2, EI, EII, ES, {EI,EII}, {ES,E1}, {ES,E2}, {E1,EII}, {E2,EI},
{ES,E1,E2}) with respect to stable equilibria.
Equilibria E1,E2 given in (9), (10) are boundary (i.e., monoculture) equilibria for plant 1 and 2,
respectively; EI,EII,ES given in (13), (17), and (19) are interior equilibria in sector I (where u1 = 1),
sector II (where u1 = 0), and the switching line (where u1 = u¯1 is given by (20)), respectively. Cases
are classified with respect to position of k1 given in (A.7) and E1 on P1 axes, k2 given in (A.11) and
E2 on P2 axes, and points a, b, p, q given in (A.8), (A.6), (A.13), (A.12) along the switching line. For
mutualisms (s = 1), q < p and a < b while for exploitation (s = −1), p < q and b < a. We remark that
for exploitation when A > r1 (A > r2), point b (p) is in the third quadrant and boundary equilibrium
E1 (E2) is not feasible. Table A.2 considers all generic cases excluding those cases where one or more
inequalities between points and parameters are replaced by equalities.
D. Gradual change in preference
Preference modeled by equation (5) in the main text assumes ideal animals that are omniscient and perfect
optimizers that switch instantaneously on the plant that is more profitable. Now let us consider a more
realistic animal that adjusts its plant preferences more gradually with changes in plant densities. This can
be modeled by the Hill function
u1(P1, P2) =
(e1P1)
z
(e1P1)z + (e2P2)z
(A.21)
where the exponent z > 0 controls the steepness of preference transitions. As z converges to infinity,
graphs of the Hill functions converge to the graph of the step-like preference (5) in the main text. When
we substitute this gradual switching function in the Lotka–Volterra equations (1) of the main text, piece-
wise isoclines change into smooth curves. As the steepness exponent z increases and switching becomes
more step-like, these isoclines converge to generalized isoclines from the main text.
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Interacting Position of isoclines intersections Position of isoclines intersections along P1 and P2 axes
conditions along the switching line k1 > E2,k2 > E1 k1 > E2,k2 < E1 k1 < E2,k2 > E1 k1 < E2,k2 < E1
s = −1
c1c2 < 1
p < q < b < a EI(Fig. 5f) E1(Fig. 5c) ∅ ∅
b < a < p < q EII(Fig. 5h) ∅ E2(Fig. 5g) ∅
p < b < a < q ES ∅ ∅ ∅
b < p < q < a ES ∅ ∅ ∅
p < b < q < a ES ∅ ∅ ∅
b < p < a < q ES(Fig. 5i) ∅ ∅ ∅
c1c2 > 1
p < q < b < a ∅ E1(Fig. 6c) ∅ {E1,E2}(Fig. 6b)
b < a < p < q ∅ ∅ E2(Fig. 6g) {E1,E2}(Fig. 6d)
p < b < a < q ES {ES,E1}(Fig. 6f) {ES,E2} {ES,E1,E2}(Fig. 6e)
b < p < q < a ES (Fig. 6i) {ES,E1} {ES,E2} {ES,E1,E2}
p < b < q < a ES {ES,E1} {ES,E2} {ES,E1,E2}
b < p < a < q ES {ES,E1} {ES,E2}(Fig. 6h) {ES,E1,E2}
s = 1
c1c2 < 1
q < p < a < b EI(Fig. 7f) E1(Fig. 7c) ∅ ∅
a < b < q < p EII(Fig. 7h) ∅ E2(Fig. 7g) ∅
q < a < b < p {EI,EII} {EII,E1} {EI,E2} {E1,E2}(Fig. 7a)
a < q < p < b {EI,EII}(Fig. 7e) {EII,E1} {EI,E2} {E1,E2}
q < a < p < b {EI,EII} {EII,E1}(Fig. 7b) {EI,E2} {E1,E2}
a < q < b < p {EI,EII} {EII,E1} {EI,E2}(Fig. 7d) {E1,E2}
c1c2 > 1
q < p < a < b ∅ E1(Fig. 8c) ∅ {E1,E2}(Fig. 8b)
a < b < q < p ∅ ∅ E2(Fig. 8g) {E1,E2}(Fig. 8d)
q < a < b < p ∅ ∅ ∅ {E1,E2}
a < q < p < b ∅ ∅ ∅ {E1,E2}
q < a < p < b ∅ ∅ ∅ {E1,E2}
a < q < b < p ∅ ∅ ∅ {E1,E2} (Fig. 8a)
Table A.2. Classification of all possible stable equilibria of model (1) with adaptive animal behavior for all generic parameter cases.
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We observe (cf. Figure A.1 here vs. Figure 2 in the main text) that for sufficiently large values of the
Hill exponent the dynamics of model (1) in the main text with step-like preferences are well approximated
by plant population dynamics where animal preferences for plants are gradual and described by (A.21).
In Figure A.1 that matches Figure 2 of the main text we show a cone of intermediate plant 1 preferences
(area between 5% and 95% preference contour lines). Increasing the Hill exponent (z) towards infinity
collapses the cone into the switching line (equation (6) in the main text) and in panel b the intersection
of isoclines converges to ES given in equation (19) in the main text. Isoclines in the cone converge to the
segments of generalized isoclines that are in the switching line.
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Figure A.1. Plant isoclines (plant 1: black, plant 2: gray) and population dynamics under weak competition (c1c2 < 1)
and preferences given by the Hill function with z = 20 (dashed lines correspond to contour lines for which u1 = 0.05 and
u1 = 0.95). Panels and parameters correspond to those of Figure 2 in the main text.
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